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WARRANTLESS GPS IN
UNITED STATES V. JONES:
IS 2011 THE NEW 1984?
EDWARD BOEHME
I. INTRODUCTION
With technology rapidly changing police capabilities, the Supreme
Court must continually harmonize technological advances with
1
Fourth Amendment safeguards. United States v. Jones challenges the
Court to balance such Fourth Amendment considerations by
presenting the questions of whether the Fourth Amendment protects
against the warrantless attachment of a Global Positioning System
(GPS) tracking device to a vehicle and whether an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information
recorded by the device. This case stands to push the boundaries of the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and will test the Court’s
ability to weigh “1984” concerns against law enforcement surveillance
techniques. The Court likely will decide that the warrantless
attachment of a GPS device violates the Fourth Amendment, but will
hold that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in publicly exposed location information.
II. FACTS
In 2004, FBI agents and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department
formed a joint task force and began investigating Antoine Jones for
2
cocaine trafficking. In addition to conducting visual surveillance,
obtaining a pen register for Jones’s dialed numbers, and installing
fixed cameras near Jones’s nightclub, the joint task force obtained a
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1. United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8, 2011).
2. Brief for United States at 2, Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2011).
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warrant to install a GPS tracking device on a jeep registered to
3
Jones’s wife but frequently used by Jones. The warrant required the
agents to install the GPS device in the District of Columbia within ten
4
days of the warrant’s issuance. The agents, however, installed the
device on the eleventh day in a public parking lot in Maryland, outside
5
the sanctioned jurisdiction. The GPS device recorded Jones’s
movements and transmitted the data in real time back to law
6
enforcement for a four-week period.
Using the transmitted data to pattern Jones’s repeated presence at
suspected stash houses, the joint task force obtained warrants and
conducted several raids, finding narcotics, cash, and firearms at
7
various locations. A federal grand jury then indicted Jones for
8
conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The District Court denied Jones’s
motion to suppress the GPS evidence but excluded any evidence
9
obtained while the jeep was parked in his garage. Though jury hung
10
on the conspiracy charge in the first trial, a second trial led to Jones’s
conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and a sentence of life
11
imprisonment. The D.C. Circuit reversed Jones’s conviction and
denied a rehearing en banc, holding that the prolonged warrantless
12
GPS tracking violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
13
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” As Justice Harlan
14
explained in his concurrence in United States v. Katz, a warrantless

3. Id. at 3.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Brief for Respondent at 4, Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Sep. 26, 2011).
7. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 4.
8. Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 5.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 6.
11. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 5–6.
12. Id. at 6–9.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic
listening device outside a phone booth to record the defendant’s conversations. Id. at 348
(majority opinion). Even though the phone booth was in public, the Court held that attaching
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law enforcement activity is considered a search if the person targeted
has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy and society
15
recognizes that expectation as reasonable. As an expectation’s
“reasonableness” must be referenced to a source outside the Fourth
Amendment, courts look not only to property law concepts but also
16
to societal understandings. If the warrantless law enforcement
activity is considered a search, it requires a judicially approved
warrant to be held reasonable unless the government is able to prove
one of a few recognized exceptions, such as “hot pursuit” or “incident
17
to arrest.” According to the Supreme Court, the ex ante approval of
warrants serves as an important judicial bulwark against the abuse of
18
power. In fact, the Court has rejected the retroactive approval of
warrants, even if law enforcement had probable cause, because it
would hinge on the “far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event
19
justification.”
In determining what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
privacy, Katz and subsequent cases focus on what a person seeks to
protect as private, even in a public area, rather than looking solely to
the place where the private conduct was observed by public
20
authorities. An individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in publicly exposed information because anyone can observe that
21
information. Even though Katz focuses on the individual, homes still
receive heightened protection, and thus, anything not in plain view in
the home is generally considered protected against government
22
observation. Further, law enforcement may in some cases conduct
warrantless searches of otherwise protected areas if the search would

the listening device without a warrant constituted a “search” and violated the defendant’s
reasonable expectation of privacy because what the defendant sought to exclude was the
“uninvited ear.” Id. at 352. One who occupies a phone booth would conclude that his
conversation “will not be broadcast to the world” upon closing the door and paying the toll. Id.
15. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357–58. “Hot pursuit” means that police can enter into private areas
during an emergency or while pursuing someone who has committed a crime. United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976). “Incident to arrest” refers to the ability of the police to
arrest a person and search for weapons or other objects that would endanger the officer. Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–64 (1969).
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
19. Id. at 357–58 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
20. Id. at 351 (“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”).
21. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
22. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35, 40 (2001).
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23

A. Public Exposure and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In Katz’s person-focused approach, the extent to which someone
exposes himself to the public affects whether his subjective
expectation of privacy is reasonable. When someone travels in public,
and notably on public thoroughfares, law enforcement may engage in
visual surveillance without a warrant because an individual in public
“voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who want[s] to look” where he is
24
travelling and what he is doing. Technology that “augments” this
visual surveillance does not necessarily violate the Fourth
25
26
Amendment. In Knotts v. United States, Minnesota law enforcement
suspected the defendant of manufacturing illegal drugs and used a
beeper to track the transportation of a five-gallon drum of chloroform
27
via public highways. The Court held that the beeper tracking did not
amount to a search because the beeper revealed the same information
that could have been obtained by an officer conducting visual
28
surveillance.
Public exposure may not be dispositive, however, for the Supreme
Court also looks to what an individual expects another to do. In Bond
29
v. United States, for example, although “a bus passenger clearly
expects that his bag may be handled,” the Supreme Court nonetheless
concluded that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
when a border patrol agent squeezed the defendant’s luggage because
passengers do not expect others to “feel the bag in an exploratory
30
31
manner.” By contrast, the defendant in California v. Greenwood
had no reasonable expectation of privacy when police, in search of
narcotics evidence, searched the defendant’s opaque garbage bags left
32
on the curb. The Court found that the trash bags were accessible to

23. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121 (1984).
24. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82.
25. Id. at 282.
26. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
27. Id. at 277.
28. Id. at 285.
29. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
30. Id. at 338–39. The Supreme Court also noted that “tactile” observation differs from
visual observation in that tactile observation involves a more “serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person.” Id. at 337 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
31. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
32. Id. at 40.
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“animals, children, scavengers, [and] snoops” in an area “particularly
suited for public inspection” and “for the express purpose of having
33
strangers take it.”
B. “Plain View” and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Homes
Despite the emphasis on the person and his subjective expectation
of privacy, homes still receive heightened protection under the Fourth
34
Amendment. Any details within the home not in plain view are
considered intimate and are therefore shielded from “prying
35
government eyes.” For example, in their attempt to uncover a
36
marijuana operation, the police in Kyllo v. United States violated the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they used a
thermal-imaging device to detect heat emitting from inside the
37
defendant’s house. By employing technology “not in general public
use” without a warrant, the police acquired information attainable
38
only with an unlawful physical intrusion into the home.
Police may, however, conduct surveillance without a warrant, even
when the home is implicated, if the information is visible from a
39
public vantage point. In California v. Ciraolo, Santa Clara police
received a tip that the defendant was growing marijuana and, acting
on the tip, used a plane to photograph the defendant’s backyard at an
40
altitude of 1,000 feet. Because “private and commercial flights in the
public airways” are routine and any member of the public flying at
that altitude could have looked down and observed what the officers
saw, the Court held that this warrantless aerial surveillance was not a
41
search. The Fourth Amendment does not require police to “shield
their eyes” when observing activities visible from a “public vantage
42
43
point.” Similarly, in Florida v. Riley, the Court held that the use of a
helicopter at 400 feet to observe the backyard of a defendant was
permissible for two reasons: the officer complied with all flight

33. Id. at 40–41 (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
35. Id.
36. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
37. Id. at 29, 40.
38. Id. at 40.
39. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
40. Id. at 213.
41. Id. at 213–14.
42. Id. at 213.
43. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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44

regulations and the observation revealed “no intimate details
45
connected with the use of the home or curtilage.”
C. The Permissibility of Searches Revealing Only Non-Intimate Details
The potential of a search to reveal intimate or private details is
another factor courts consider in determining whether police violated
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, in
46
United States v. Jacobsen, a FedEx supervisor, pursuant to the
47
company’s insurance policy, opened a damaged package to inspect it.
After discovering a white powdery substance, the employee
rewrapped the package and alerted the Drug Enforcement
48
Administration (DEA). Two DEA field tests confirmed that the
49
powder was cocaine. The Court held that the DEA field tests were
not an unreasonable search because the tests determined only
whether the substance was cocaine and revealed no other private
50
details.
Nonetheless, law enforcement cannot use a defendant’s property
without his knowledge and consent to reveal even non-intimate
51
details. In Silverman v. United States, the officers attached a spike
microphone to the heating duct on the defendant’s house to
52
investigate a suspected gambling operation. The Court held that the
officers violated the Fourth Amendment because they “usurp[ed] part
of the petitioners’ house . . . without their knowledge and without
53
their consent.”

44. Id. at 451.
45. Id. at 452.
46. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
47. Id. at 111.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 111–12.
50. See id. at 123 (noting that Congress already determined that no one has a legitimate
privacy interest in cocaine because of its illegality); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707 (1983) (holding that the use of narcotics-sniffing dogs violates no legitimate privacy interest
because such a search does not involve opening luggage or revealing noncontraband items);
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233–34, 236 (1986) (holding that aerial
photography of Dow Chemical’s industrial complex was legal because the company was already
subject to heavy environmental regulation, the government is generally granted greater latitude
in inspecting commercial property, and the photographs did not reveal intimate activities such
as chemical formulas, trade secrets, or individual privacy).
51. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
52. Id. at 506–07.
53. Id. at 511.
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IV. HOLDING
54

In United States v. Maynard, the D.C. Circuit held that GPS
tracking of respondent Jones for twenty-four hours a day over a four55
week period violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
Analyzing whether the use of GPS-enhanced surveillance constituted
a search, the court first determined that Knotts was not controlling
56
precedent. According to the court, Knotts applied only to “limited”
technological tracking on a “discrete journey” and reserved the
question of prolonged, twenty-four hour surveillance for cases like the
57
one at issue.
The court then discussed whether Jones had exposed his
58
movements to the public, reiterating that the reasonable expectation
of privacy regarding publicly exposed information depends on what
59
an individual expects another to do. The court ruled that Jones had
60
neither “actually” nor “constructively” exposed his movements. First,
because the likelihood that an individual would observe “all those
movements” over the course of a month was “essentially nil,” the
61
court held that Jones’s movements were not “actually” exposed.
Second, employing the “mosaic” theory articulated in People v.
62
Weaver, the court also held that Jones movements were not
63
“constructively” exposed. The D.C. Circuit noted that prolonged
surveillance by a GPS device reveals a holistic and intimate picture of
a person’s private life by disclosing a large volume of personal details
64
that an individual would not expect to be pieced together. Although

54. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, No. 101259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8, 2011).
55. Id. at 555–56.
56. Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 469 U.S. 276, 283 (1983)).
57. Id. at 556 (citing Knotts, 469 U.S. at 283–84 (noting that the case did not involve
twenty-hour surveillance and that “‘if such dragnet type law enforcement . . . should eventually
occur, there will be time enough to determine whether different constitutional principles may be
applicable’”)).
58. Id. at 558–63.
59. Id. at 559.
60. Id. at 558.
61. Id. at 558–59. The court contrasted the highly unlikely scenario of following someone
day after day over the course of the month with the more likely situation of an individual
observing another for a single journey. Id. at 560.
62. 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).
63. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561–62 (citing Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199).
64. See id. at 563 (“A reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a
record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each place he
stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those movements to remain
‘disconnected and anonymous.’”).
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Jones’s individual movements were exposed, the whole of his
movements were not, and therefore, the court held that Jones had a
65
subjective expectation of privacy.
Finally, the court concluded that society would recognize Jones’s
66
expectation of privacy as reasonable. As the Supreme Court had
stated previously, “‘[e]xpectations of privacy must have a source
outside the Fourth Amendment,’ such as ‘understandings that are
67
recognized or permitted by society.’” The D.C. Circuit pointed to
state criminal codes that exclude warrantless GPS evidence as an
indication that society recognizes Jones’s expectation of privacy as
68
reasonable. The court also distinguished permissible visual
69
surveillance from the prolonged GPS tracking in this case. Unlike
visual surveillance, which is naturally constrained by the time and
expense of manpower, along with the risk of being sighted, the low
cost of GPS tracking “occasion[s] a heretofore unknown type of
70
intrusion into an ordinarily and hitherto private enclave.” The court
ultimately held that the warrantless GPS evidence should have been
71
excluded.
V. ARGUMENTS
The government and Jones focus on three main issues. First,
whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location
information gathered by the GPS device. Second, whether Jones had a
reasonable expectation of privacy against the actual attachment of the
GPS device to the jeep. Last, whether the government should be
permitted to use a reasonable suspicion standard when employing
GPS tracking without a warrant.
A. Petitioner Government’s Arguments
The government appeals the D.C. Circuit’s decision on three
grounds: first, Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
jeep’s location information because the information was already

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 563 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.22 (1984)).
68. Id. at 564.
69. Id. at 565–66.
70. Id. at 565.
71. Id. at 568 (stating that the error of admitting the GPS evidence was not harmless
because the evidence was “far from ‘overwhelming’”).
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publicly exposed; second, Jones had no reasonable expectation of
privacy against the actual attachment of the GPS device to the jeep;
and third, even if a search or seizure occurred, it was reasonable
because the government’s interest in uncovering a large narcotics
operation outweighs the minimal intrusion on Jones’s privacy interest.
First, the government contends that no search occurred when
agents used a GPS tracking device to record the jeep’s location
information on public roads because Jones did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding movements that he exposed to the
72
public. The government argues that Katz and its progeny emphasize
the distinction between private details and publicly exposed
73
information. The government asserts that, like in Knotts, the GPS
merely tracked the movements of Jones’s vehicle on public roads,
74
which were exposed to “anyone who wanted to look.”
According to the government, it is immaterial that no one would
75
have observed all of Jones’s movements over the course of a month.
Neither Greenwood nor Bond depended on the likelihood that
76
someone would observe the information. The government also
rejects the D.C. Circuit’s “mosaic theory,” arguing that no case has
found a reasonable expectation of privacy in the “totality of [one’s]
77
public movements” when each movement is publicly exposed. Both
the “likelihood” standard and the “mosaic” theory present
unworkable tests because they provide guidance for neither
predicting the likelihood that one would observe a set of movements
nor analyzing how prolonged the surveillance must be before it
72. Brief for United States, supra note 2, at 37–38.
73. See id. at 18–22. In Knotts, the Court sanctioned the warrantless use of a beeper to
track the defendant while he traveled on public thoroughfares because the defendant conveyed
to “anyone who wanted to look” the fact that he was traveling on such public thoroughfares. Id.
at 19–20 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277–78, 281–82 (1983)). According to the
government, the Court in Kyllo likewise focused on the distinction between private details and
publicly exposed information when it determined that the use of a thermal-imaging device was a
search because the device revealed private information inside the home not obtainable without
physical intrusion. Id. at 22 (discussing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 34, 40 (2001)).
74. Id. at 38 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. at 22–23.
76. See id. at 24–25. The government reasoned that Greenwood’s outcome depended not
on the likelihood that someone would sort through the opaque trash bags, but rather the ready
access to the trash bags by any member of the public because of their location. Id. at 24 (citing
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1988)). Similarly, Bond distinguished “physical”
and “tactile” observation and highlighted the fact that the physical manipulation of the luggage
revealed private information that had not already been publicly exposed. Id. at 25 (citing Bond
v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337–39 (2000)).
77. Id. at 27–28.
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78

becomes “mosaic.”
The government also argues that “hypothetical misuses” and
“dragnet surveillance” are inappropriate considerations in a case
79
limited to the GPS tracking of one individual. Though the Court in
Knotts reserved the question of “dragnet surveillance,” such
surveillance refers to “mass or widespread search or seizures
conducted without individualized suspicion,” which is not the case
80
with Jones. Even if GPS tracking raises such concerns, prophylactic
measures should be taken through the legislative process rather than
81
through the “distortion of Fourth Amendment doctrine.”
Second, with respect to the exterior of the vehicle, the government
contends that Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy against
82
the attachment of the GPS device to his vehicle. The attachment of
the GPS device revealed no private information and therefore did not
83
constitute a search. The attachment also did not meaningfully
interfere with Jones’s possessory interest in the jeep—so as to
constitute a seizure—because the GPS device did not affect the
84
vehicle’s “driving qualities.” As the Court stated in United States v.
85
Karo, trespass alone is “neither necessary nor sufficient to establish
86
a [seizure].”
Finally, even if the Court finds a search or seizure, the government
87
contends that the attachment of the GPS device was reasonable. The
government argues that current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
dictates that the Court conduct a balancing test to determine the
reasonableness of a search or seizure by comparing the “degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” to the need to promote
88
“legitimate government interests.”
Here, according to the
78. Id. at 31.
79. Id. at 37.
80. Id. at 34.
81. Id. at 35.
82. Id. at 39.
83. Id. at 41. The government distinguished between the GPS device’s potential to reveal
private information, achieved upon installation of the device, and actual revelation of the
information, not realized until after it started transmitting. Id. at 42.
84. Id. at 44.
85. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
86. Brief for United States, supra note 2, at 43 (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 47.
88. Id. at 48 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The government relies on the reasoning in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in
which the Court looked to the “reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
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government, the individual privacy interest remains “minimal”
because the only information revealed by the GPS device is the
vehicle’s location, which is already obtainable through visual
89
surveillance.
Also, requiring a warrant would impair the
“government’s ability to investigate leads and tips on drug trafficking,
90
terrorism, and other crimes.” The government argues that because its
interest in uncovering a large-scale narcotics operation outweighed
the minimal intrusion on Jones’s privacy, the “particularized suspicion
was more than adequate to support the warrantless attachment of a
91
mobile tracking device” to Jones’s vehicle.
B. Respondent Jones’s Arguments
Jones’s brief centers on three main arguments: first, the
information collected by the GPS device violated his reasonable
expectation of privacy; second, the installation itself violated his
reasonable expectation of privacy and meaningfully interfered with
his possessory interest in the vehicle; and third, the reasonable
suspicion standard for GPS tracking should not be used in lieu of a
warrant supported by probable cause.
First, asserting that the agents violated his reasonable expectation
of privacy, Jones argues that the government recorded the whole of
92
his movements to a “degree not feasible through visual surveillance.”
Even though each separate movement itself might be publicly
exposed, the whole of one’s movements is not because the “likelihood
93
a stranger would observe all those movements is . . . essentially nil.”
Because of the uniquely private nature of an individual’s “pattern of
movements and locations,” prolonged monitoring presents the danger
of the “twenty-four hour surveillance” espoused in Knotts, an
argument that resembles the “mosaic theory” used by the D.C. Circuit
94
in Maynard.

governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security” during a street stop and frisk. Brief for
United States, supra note 2, at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 49–50.
90. Id. at 50.
91. Id. at 51.
92. Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 43.
93. Id. (quoting United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted
sub nom. United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8, 2011)).
94. Compare id. at 43–44 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983)) with
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (describing the “mosaic” theory).
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Second, Jones argues that the warrantless attachment of the
device itself was an unreasonable search because the attachment
95
usurped Jones’s property. Based on the Court’s holding in Silverman
that “usurpation of property [is] a search,” Jones argues that the
agents misappropriated his property by converting the jeep into a
96
mobile tracking device for the government’s purposes. Because
attaching a GPS device without another’s consent can lead to both a
trespass claim and criminal liability under anti-stalking statutes, Jones
argues that society would consider his subjective expectation against
97
GPS attachment to be reasonable. Jones cautions that such
unrestrained GPS tracking presents the danger of “indiscriminate
monitoring” because the low marginal cost of GPS attachment, as
compared to the high cost of visual surveillance, permits police to
conduct “suspicionless GPS monitoring of networks of individuals
98
and even entire neighborhoods, towns, or cities.”
Jones also maintains that the agents conducted an unreasonable
seizure because the GPS device “meaningfully interfered with Jones’s
99
possessory interest” in the jeep. Jones argues that the government’s
attachment changed the character of the vehicle by undermining
100
Jones’s possessory right to exclude others from the use of the jeep.
Because “a private individual’s surreptitious use of a GPS device
against another would constitute trespass to chattels and possibly
even criminal conduct,” Jones reasonably believed that his right to
101
exclude others would not be violated by law enforcement. Contrary
to the government’s position, meaningful interference need not
102
involve damage or destruction to the property. Rather, the Fourth
Amendment protects against “purposeful” interference and abuses of
103
power.

95. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 16–17 (arguing that the government’s
“usurpation” of Jones’s property “supports the conclusion that his privacy expectations were
reasonable,” and therefore that the search was unreasonable).
96. Id. at 18–19 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506–07 (1961)).
97. Id. at 20.
98. Id. at 26–27. Jones also notes that unlike GPS monitoring, an equivalent level of
human surveillance would require an extraordinary amount of personnel and resources, which
acts as a check against the kinds of indiscriminate abuses and monitoring that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect. Id. at 25.
99. Id. at 46.
100. Id. at 48–49.
101. Id. at 49.
102. Id. at 50.
103. Id. at 51.
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Finally, Jones claims that the government’s balancing test for the
104
warrantless use of a GPS device is inappropriate. Not only does the
government’s reasonable suspicion standard have no basis in the
105
Fourth Amendment as a workaround to probable cause, but the
government, in justifying the balancing test in its favor, mistakenly
assumes that the intrusion was minor and exaggerates the efficiency
106
gains law enforcement would enjoy as a result of GPS use. Jones
further maintains that the reasonable suspicion standard is
unworkable because the government is not required to record its
reasons for warrantless GPS tracking and, even if it were required, the
107
innocent would never know whether their rights were violated. By
contrast, a “neutral magistrate” deciding ex ante whether a search or
seizure is justified can better ensure protection against surreptitious
108
GPS monitoring.
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION
Unfettered GPS monitoring portends a world enveloped by
unforgettable images of “1984.” In the most probable scenario, the
Court will rule in favor of Jones and will attempt to strike a balance
between the “1984” concerns of unfettered GPS monitoring and the
need of law enforcement to use visual surveillance and video camera
techniques. First, the Court likely will hold that Jones did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information
gathered by the GPS device. Second, the Court probably will decide
that the actual affixing of the GPS on the jeep violated Jones’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. Third, the Court is likely to reject
the reasonable suspicion standard proposed by the government as
undermining the constitutional safeguards of requiring a warrant,
noting that the warrant requirement is more feasible and less
burdensome than law enforcement suggests.

104. Id. at 56.
105. Id. at 57–58.
106. Id. at 58. In retort to the “minor intrusion” argument, Jones points to the GPS device’s
infringement on property rights as well as its ability to generate a holistic view of an individual’s
life. Id. Jones also explains the exaggeration of efficiency gains by noting the government’s
admission that it cannot know ahead of time whether the device will generate private data. Id.
107. Id. at 60.
108. See id. (“[Fourth Amendment rights] would be all the more difficult to protect if the
government were free to engage in surreptitious GPS monitoring without first persuading a
neutral magistrate that a search or seizure is justified.”).
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First, the Court likely will hold that Jones did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy over his location information
because his movements were actually exposed. Here, Knotts is the
109
most analogous case. GPS tracking devices, like the beeper in
Knotts, transmit publicly exposed information—in this case, Jones’s
110
travels on public roads. Bond suggests that Jones had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements because these expectations
111
may be borne from what an individual expects another to do. That
proposition is likely limited, however, to “tactile” or more physically
intrusive observation, considering that Ciraolo and Riley depended on
the ability of an individual to observe the defendant’s private
property while flying overhead, not whether an individual was likely
112
do so. During oral argument, the Court strongly hinted at the
trouble of finding a search by inviting Jones’s counsel to distinguish
GPS tracking from a string of video cameras or thirty deputies
113
monitoring public streets. As the Seventh Circuit noted, unlike the
thermal-imaging device in Kyllo, a GPS device is merely a substitute
for “following a car on a public street”—a permissible act under the
114
Fourth Amendment.
Second, the Court is likely to be more persuaded by Jones’s
arguments regarding the usurpation and physical intrusion of his jeep.
Reasonable expectations of privacy must be referenced to a source
outside the Fourth Amendment, such as property law and societal
115
understandings. Jones argues that if anti-stalking laws and trespass
claims prohibit private individuals from affixing a GPS device to track
another private individual, then it would be amiss to permit police,
under the auspice of the Fourth Amendment, to do what private
116
individuals cannot.

109. See generally United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (discussing the warrantless
use of a beeper to track the defendant).
110. See id. at 281–82 (“[H]e voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact
that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction.”).
111. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (“[A] bus passenger clearly
expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect that other passengers or bus
employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.”).
112. See id. at 337 (emphasis added) (distinguishing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), from Bond, 529 U.S. 334, and noting that “any
member of the public could have fully observed the defendant’s property by flying overhead”).
113. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–35, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Nov.
8, 2011).
114. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007).
115. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
116. Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 20.
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Several cases support this argument. In Riley and Ciraolo, no
search occurred when law enforcement merely did what members of
the public could already do: observe property made visible from a
117
particular public vantage point. In Greenwood, the police officers’
search of the defendant’s garbage was permissible because of the
trash bags’ placement on the side of a public street and accessibility
118
by any member of the public. If the Fourth Amendment limits
warrantless police conduct to what members of the public may do,
then consistency may compel the Court to find that Jones’s subjective
expectation of privacy against the agents’ attachment of the device to
the jeep was reasonable because the action would be illegal for
private individuals. Further, Silverman demonstrates that the Fourth
Amendment may prohibit police officers from usurping a defendant’s
119
property for their own investigative ends. The Court in Bond also
120
recognized that physical invasions are more intrusive than mere
visual surveillance and considered what an individual expects others
121
to do in those cases. Both propositions, then, appear to militate
against police usurping Jones’s jeep as their own tracking device and
undermining Jones’s property right to exclude others from its use.
Finally, the Court likely will reject the government’s call for a
reasonable suspicion standard. The government argues for such a
standard in the context of GPS-enhanced surveillance because a
122
probable cause standard would unduly burden investigations. This
argument ignores the justification for the judicial bulwark between
123
law enforcement and private citizens. The government, in arguing
that the warrant requirement would be too burdensome, assumes that
expectations of privacy are unimportant in the context of GPS
surveillance. Because “reasonable” expectations of privacy determine
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection, the “burden” of the

117. Riley, 488 U.S. at 454–55; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14.
118. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988).
119. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding that officers could
not usurp the heat duct serving the defendant’s property by attaching a spike microphone to
eavesdrop on the defendant’s gambling operation).
120. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000) (quoting Riley, 488 U.S. at 449)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See id. (“[P]hysical manipulation of his luggage ‘far exceeded the casual contact
[petitioner] could have expected from other passengers.’”).
122. Brief for United States, supra note 2, at 50.
123. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (citation omitted) (“The primary
reason for the warrant requirement is to interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between
the citizen and ‘the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”).
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warrant is actually irrelevant to the inquiry of whether a warrant
should be required in the first place. To analogize, one could not argue
that intrusions into the home should be on a lesser “reasonable
suspicion” standard simply because requiring a warrant for the search
124
of the home would unduly burden investigations. Instead, courts
require police to furnish additional evidence and establish probable
cause before issuing a warrant to search a house because these
125
searches invade reasonable expectations of privacy. The Chief
Justice emphasized this point by asking why the government wanted a
126
different rule to apply to GPS tracking. A court could simply
require police to gather additional evidence and establish probable
cause before installing a GPS device.
Moreover, the Court is likely to find that a warrant requirement
for GPS tracking is not overly burdensome on law enforcement.
Justice Ginsburg addressed this point during oral argument by noting
that the agents in this case had already received a warrant as required
127
by their surveillance manual. Unlike visual surveillance, where
beneficial and warrantless use can stem from on-the-spot surveillance
of suspicious acts, GPS tracking requires advanced preparation and
planning due to the coordination of the GPS’s installation, possible
128
battery replacement, and ultimate analysis of the information. This
advanced preparation and planning suggests that police might not
otherwise invest in GPS surveillance against an individual unless they
already possess enough information to prompt the belief that it would
129
uncover more evidence. Thus, a warrant requirement for GPS
tracking would not present the extraordinary burdens that the
130
government suggests,
especially because police have capably
conducted such investigations prior to the advent of GPS technology.

124. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356, 358 (1967) (noting that retroactive
approval of search warrants “‘bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an
after-the-event justification’” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964))).
125. See id. (articulating the Court’s disfavor of law enforcement bypassing the
constitutional safeguard of the warrant requirement).
126. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 113, at 17–18.
127. Id. at 16–17.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 607–08 (8th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994,
995–96 (7th Cir. 2007); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y. 2009); State v. Jackson,
76 P.3d 217, 220–21 (Wash. 2003).
129. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 128.
130. Brief for United States, supra note 2, at 50.
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In essence, the Court manifested grave “1984” concerns over
unfettered, warrantless GPS tracking and expressed a desire for a
131
limiting principle. The Court had trouble, however, distinguishing
132
visual surveillance and video cameras from Jones’s case. By deciding
Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy on “usurpation” grounds
rather than on location information grounds, the Court can strike a
balance. On one hand, the Court safeguards against “1984” masssurveillance scenarios by prohibiting law enforcement from
converting a person’s car, coat, or cell phone into a tracking device in
derogation of his property rights. On the other hand, the government
could still use visual surveillance and public video cameras because
individuals have no legitimate privacy expectation in publicly exposed
location information.
By deciding that Jones’s movements were actually exposed,
however, the Court avoids opining on the “mosaic theory” of
constructive exposure put forth by both the D.C. Circuit and Jones.
The consequence could be that the Court ironically leaves open the
possibility that law enforcement may compile complete profiles of
133
individuals through Internet data mining. Although the Court may
have avoided “1984” with respect to GPS monitoring, the threat of
mass data collection programs means that “Big Brother” still looms to
cast a pall over Fourth Amendment protections.

131. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 113, at 12–13. (“[A]s I understand it and
certainly share the concern . . . if [the government wins] the case then there is nothing to prevent
the police or the government from monitoring 24 hours a day the public movements of every
citizen in the United States.”).
132. Id. at 34–35, 38.
133. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107, 121 (Summer 2010) (discussing the Total Information Awareness program and other
government mass-collection efforts to create profiles through data-mining of “credit-card
purchases, tax returns, driver’s license data, work permits, travel itineraries,” and more).

